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Capital Ratios as Predictors 
of Bank Failure
apital ratios have long been a valuable tool for assessing  
the safety and soundness of banks. The informal use of 
ratios by bank regulators and supervisors goes back well over a 
century (Mitchell 1909). In the United States, minimum capital 
ratios have been required in banking regulation since 1981, and 
the Basel Accord has applied capital ratio requirements to 
banks internationally since 1988. The Basel Committee on 
Banking Supervision (1999) is currently engaged in an effort to 
improve the Basel Accord and, once again, capital ratios are 
being discussed as part of the proposed solution. In this article, 
we examine some of the roles that capital ratios play in bank 
regulation and we argue that, to be successful in any of these 
roles, capital ratios should bear a significant negative relation-
ship to the risk of subsequent bank failure. We then present 
empirical evidence of those relationships.
We focus here on three types of capital ratios—risk-
weighted, leverage, and gross revenue ratios. For each ratio, we 
examine what makes it actually or potentially useful for bank 
regulation and we ask whether it is indeed significantly related 
to subsequent bank failure. Perhaps not surprisingly, we find 
that all three ratios are strongly informative about subsequent 
failures. Our analysis suggests that the most complex of the 
ratios—the risk-weighted ratio—is the most effective predictor 
of failure over long time horizons. However, perhaps 
somewhat surprisingly, we also find that the risk-weighted 
ratio does not consistently outperform the simpler ratios, 
particularly with short horizons of less than two years. Over the 
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• The current regulatory framework for 
determining bank capital adequacy is under 
review by the Basel Committee on Banking 
Supervision.
• An empirical analysis of the relationships 
between different capital ratios and bank 
failure suggests that two simple ratios—the 
leverage ratio and the ratio of capital to gross 
revenue—may merit a role in the revised 
framework.
• The leverage ratio and the gross revenue ratio 
predict bank failure about as well as more 
complex risk-weighted ratios over one- or 
two-year horizons. Risk-weighted ratios tend 
to perform better over longer horizons.
• The simple ratios are virtually costless to 
implement and could supplement more 
sophisticated measures by providing a timely 
signal of the need for supervisory action.
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shorter time periods, the leverage and gross revenue ratios can 
play a crucial role as timely backstop thresholds that would 
trigger regulatory action if breached. They also have the 
advantage of being less costly to calculate and report. In this 
context, the trade-off between regulatory burden and 
predictive accuracy may not favor the risk-based measures.
In the next section, we develop the conceptual arguments in 
favor of applying capital ratios in bank regulation. We then 
proceed to use the empirical evidence on U.S. bank failures to 
evaluate the effectiveness of the ratios in predicting bank 
failures.
The Role of Capital Ratios in Bank 
Analysis and Supervision
Although bank regulators have relied on capital ratios formally 
or informally for a very long time, they have not always used 
the ratios in the same way. For instance, in the days before 
explicit capital requirements, bank supervisors would use 
capital ratios as rules of thumb to gauge the adequacy of an 
institution’s level of capital. There was no illusion that the 
simple ratios used (for example, capital to total assets or capital 
to deposits) could provide an accurate measure of the 
appropriate capital level for a bank, but large deviations of 
actual capital ratios from supervisory benchmarks suggested 
the need for further scrutiny.
When capital ratios were introduced formally in regulation 
in 1981 (see Gilbert, Stone, and Trebing [1985]), they were 
applied in a different way. The regulatory requirement set a 
minimum level of capital that the institution had to hold.  The 
degree to which the requirement was binding depended 
significantly on the type of institution because, then as now, 
there was substantial diversity among banking institutions. 
Indeed, several classes of institutions  were initially defined and 
accorded different treatment by the regulation. Basically, the 
requirements were most binding for less than a couple of dozen 
large banks, whereas smaller banks were generally already in 
compliance with the more stringent requirements.
The Basel Accord of 1988 attempted to deal with the 
diversity in institutional activities by applying different credit 
risk weights to different positions and by including in the base 
for the capital ratio a measure of the off-balance-sheet 
exposures of the bank. Despite these calibrations, the intent 
was not to determine an exact appropriate level of capital for 
the bank, but rather to provide a more flexible way of 
determining the minimum required level (Basel Committee on 
Banking Supervision 1988).
Another significant regulatory development in the United 
States was the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation 
Improvement Act of 1991 (FDICIA), which introduced the 
concept of “prompt corrective action.” The degree of 
supervisory intervention in specific banks is now guided by a 
formula driven largely by the Basel ratios and by a simple 
leverage ratio. Banks are classified as “adequately capitalized” 
if they meet the Basel requirements plus a leverage ratio 
requirement, but additional distinctions are made among 
levels of capital. For example, a bank is “well capitalized” if it 
holds a certain buffer above the adequate levels.
In contrast, a bank that falls under a specific level, set 
somewhat below the minimum adequate level, is determined to 
be “critically undercapitalized” and must be shut down by 
supervisors. This is a different concept of a minimum 
requirement from the one used in earlier regulation in that 
failure to comply results in the closure of the institution. Rather 
than a minimum safe operating level, which the earlier rules 
had tried to identify, the new cutoff point is a backstop level, 
below which the bank is no longer considered to be viable.
The June 1999 Basel capital proposal goes beyond the ratios 
based on accounting data that we have discussed so far. The 
proposal contemplates (1) the use of external credit ratings as 
determinants of the weights to be applied to various asset 
categories, (2) the use, for the same purpose, of internal bank 
credit ratings based on the firm’s own judgment, and (3) the 
extended recognition of various forms of credit risk mitigation. 
These features constitute a difference in kind, not simply 
magnitude, as compared with the accounting-based ratios on 
which we focus in this article. Ideally, we would like to be able 
to compute ratios based on the new proposal to examine their 
power to predict failure, but the required information simply 
does not exist at this time. We should note, however, that we do 
not argue here that the ratios that we do examine should 
substitute for any of the foregoing Basel proposals. Our goal 
instead is to suggest that some of those ratios contain valuable 
and virtually costless information, and therefore have a role in 
an overall framework for regulatory capital.
Our goal . . . is to suggest that [the leverage 
and gross revenue] ratios contain valuable 
and virtually costless information, and 
therefore have a role in an overall 
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The preceding discussion alludes to a number of 
distinctions between approaches to benchmarks based on 
capital ratios, and it may be helpful to spell these out. In some 
cases, a ratio is intended as a minimum acceptable level, 
whereas in other cases, the ratio may identify an appropriate 
level of capital for the bank. This distinction between a 
minimum and an “optimum” level is discussed in detail in 
Estrella (1995).
Another distinction is between adequate levels and backstop 
levels, such as in the 1991 FDICIA legislation. In one case, there 
is a certain level of comfort for bank supervisors, while in the 
other case, the bank is no longer considered viable. It is possible 
that a particular ratio may be more suited for one of these two 
cases than for the other.
Closely related is the distinction between the value of a bank 
in liquidation and the value of a bank as a going concern. For 
instance, one of the motivations for the 1991 legislation was 
that the net value of a bank tends to decrease when the bank 
ceases to be a going concern and moves into liquidation mode 
(see, for example, Demsetz, Saidenberg, and Strahan [1996]). 
Thus, the level of capital that is adequate for regulatory and 
supervisory purposes may differ between banks operating 
normally and banks in the process of liquidation. These 
distinctions are demonstrated in the following simple graph.
The optimum level, defined in various ways in economic 
research (see discussions in Estrella [1995] and Berger, 
Herring, and Szegö [1995]), is shown as point C in the graph. 
Theoretically, this is the level that maximizes some objective 
function for bank owners, but in practice this exact level is very 
difficult to ascertain with any precision. Nevertheless, there is 
an informal range around this level, say from point B to point 
D, over which capital may be generally considered adequate for 
a going concern. That is, capital is high enough to allow 
regulators, shareholders, and depositors to sleep at night, but 
not so high that the total cost of capital to the firm outweighs 
its benefits. Finally, point A identifies the backstop level at 
which the bank is no longer viable and must be shut down to 
prevent losses to depositors and to the public.
The Relationship between Capital Ratios 
and Bank Failure
The relationship between the level of capital and subsequent 
failure is clear in the case of a backstop level as defined above. 
At this level, the bank is either a de facto failure or is in 
imminent danger of falling into that category. Therefore, 
regulators must choose a backstop level that is highly correlated 
with failure in the very short run; that is, the level should be 
associated with a fairly high probability of failure. Regulators 
will generally select a positive level for the backstop rather than 
the level of technical insolvency at which the net worth of the 
bank is zero. One reason is that the valuation of the bank is not 
known precisely until liquidation. There is no assurance that a 
liquidated bank will be valued at the accounting net worth, 
although this type of uncertainty could signify that the actual 
value of the bank could be either higher or lower than the 
accounting value. A second reason is that, for a going concern, 
there is generally a “charter value”—an intangible value that 
disappears with the closure of the institution. Hence, even if 
the accounting valuation were perfectly accurate in the first 
sense, the mere liquidation of the institution could lead to a 
loss in net value.
This potential loss in the value of the firm in liquidation 
also helps explain why capital levels in general should be 
significantly related to bank failure. The charter value of the 
bank produces a strong incentive to the owners of the bank to 
manage it as a going concern. If the bank fails, one consequence 
is the dissipation of charter value—value that the owners could 
capture by selling their stakes if the institution were viable. 
Thus, owners have an interest in maintaining a level of capital 
that is consistent with a low probability of failure. Needless to 
say, regulators and supervisors also tend to favor low 
probabilities of failure.
To summarize, with reference once more to the graph, 
the backstop level at point A corresponds to a fairly high 
probability of failure but represents enough capital to deal with 
uncertainties relating to the value of the firm in liquidation. In 
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contrast, values above point B correspond to probabilities of 
failure that are sufficiently low to satisfy the requirements of 
owners, regulators, and others.
Useful Features of Capital Ratios
A capital ratio is constructed from two components. The 
numerator is a measure of the absolute amount (for example, 
the dollar value) of capital of the firm and is inversely related to 
the probability of failure. The denominator is a proxy for the 
absolute level of risk of the bank. By taking the ratio we are able 
to gauge whether the absolute amount of capital is adequate in 
relation to some indicator of absolute risk. Basically, a large 
bank needs a larger amount of capital than a small bank, ceteris 
paribus, and a riskier bank needs more capital than a less risky 
bank, ceteris paribus. Absolute risk is probably roughly 
proportional to scale, so that measures of scale are generally 
good proxies for absolute risk. The three ratios we examine in 
this paper represent various approaches to measuring scale and 
absolute risk.
We will define the ratios more precisely in the next section, 
but we provide here some preliminary discussion of how each 
deals with scale and risk. Let us assume, as is the case in our 
empirical sections, that the numerator is the same measure of 
capital for all ratios, which allows us to focus on the alternative 
denominators. In the case of the leverage ratio, the denominator 
is the total assets of the bank. This measure, which has a long 
history, assumes implicitly that the capital needs of a bank are 
directly proportional to its level of assets. For some broad 
classes of banks, this may not be a bad assumption. However, if 
we take the example of two banks, only one of which has 
substantial and risky off-balance-sheet activities, the use of the 
leverage ratio may produce misleading relative results.
A leverage ratio requirement may also affect the asset 
allocation of banks that are constrained by the requirement. 
Constrained banks are likely to reduce low-risk assets such as 
Treasury securities, which are easily marketable, as opposed to 
less marketable assets such as loans. Nevertheless, a clear 
advantage of the leverage ratio is simplicity. It is virtually 
costless to administer and very transparent.
In 1988, the Basel Accord introduced the concept of risk-
weighted assets as the denominator of the capital ratio. This 
measure contains a component representing off-balance-sheet 
exposures and also adjusts for differentials in credit risk 
according to type of counterparty and type of instrument. As 
such, the Basel ratio represents a well-known example of a risk 
adjustment to the basic scale of the denominator.
Risk weighting effectively requires financial institutions to 
charge more capital for riskier assets, discouraging them from 
holding risky assets. By responding to the risk-reducing 
incentives, banks can increase the risk-weighted ratio without 
raising capital. On the other hand, failure to respond would 
result in a low risk-weighted ratio. Thus, if risk weights 
accurately reflect the riskiness of assets, the risk-weighted ratio 
should better distinguish between risky and safe banks and 
should be a more effective predictor of bank failure than simple 
ratios. Inaccuracy is unavoidable, however. Because each loan 
is unique, it is difficult to evaluate the credit risk of bank assets. 
In addition, the business of banking is subject to significant 
sources of risk other than credit risk, such as interest rate risk, 
operational risk, and reputational risk. Weighting assets can 
weaken the relationship between the capital ratio and these 
other risks—operational risk in particular.
Furthermore, the financial sector is so dynamic that new 
products are introduced continuously. Even a well-designed 
risk-weighting scheme may soon become obsolete as new 
instruments provide means of economizing on regulatory 
capital. Considering these difficulties, it is not certain a priori 
that the risk-based capital ratio is meaningfully superior to 
simple ratios in capturing the overall risk of banks. Regulatory 
capital arbitrage under risk-based capital requirements could 
even produce harmful economic effects. For instance, since 
lending to risky borrowers belongs in the highest risk-weight 
category, the incentive to economize capital might induce 
banks to reduce lending to those borrowers that do not have 
alternative financing sources.1 Economic activity may contract 
as a result. In addition, it is costly to administer risk-based 
capital requirements, especially since both monitoring and 
reporting burdens may be heavy.
Our third ratio—not currently part of the regulatory 
framework but suggested, for example, by Shepheard- 
Walwyn and Litterman (1998)—uses the gross revenue of the 
bank as the measure of scale. Like total assets, gross revenue 
is easily obtainable from the financial statements of the firm 
and thus is virtually costless to administer. Unlike assets, 
however, gross revenue includes components associated with 
off-balance-sheet activities. Moreover, gross revenue contains 
a crude “risk adjustment” in that riskier projects are likely to 
be undertaken only if they provide larger revenues, at least 
ex ante. Thus, gross revenue may reflect the riskiness of bank 
It is not certain a priori that the risk-based 
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assets better than total assets, though in principle not as well as 
risk-weighted assets.
A potential drawback is that gross revenue also captures 
factors other than risk. For example, banks engaging heavily in 
fee-generating activities, which may carry only a limited 
amount of risk, will report large revenue. Gross revenue may 
also be more sensitive to business cycles than total assets, 
although this is not entirely clear and is largely an empirical 
question. This measure has not been subjected to the test of 
actual usage, but gross revenue seems to be less susceptible to 
regulatory capital arbitrage than other measures. For instance, 
it may be difficult for banks to reduce gross revenue without 
hurting profits or general investor perceptions. As for 
simplicity, gross revenue is, like assets, a standard accounting 
concept. Thus, the gross revenue ratio is as simple and 
transparent as the leverage ratio.
Capital Ratios and the Likelihood 
of Failure
To assess the predictive efficacy of capital ratios, our analysis 
utilizes standard measures defined by the existing capital 
adequacy rules. The measure of capital applied in the numera-
tor of all three ratios is tier 1 capital, defined to include 
common stock, common stock surplus, retained earnings, and 
some perpetual preferred stock. The risk-weighted capital ratio 
is defined as the ratio of tier 1 capital to risk-weighted assets. 
The definition of the leverage ratio is tier 1 capital divided by 
total tangible assets (quarterly average). The gross revenue ratio 
is tier 1 capital divided by total interest and noninterest income 
before the deduction of any expenses.
Our database includes all FDIC-insured commercial banks 
that failed or were in business between 1989 and 1993. The 
sample period ends in 1993 because for the most part there 
were just a handful of bank failures after this period. Because 
risk-weighted capital measures were not implemented and 
reported until after 1990, it is difficult to estimate meaningful 
risk-weighted ratios in the early and mid-1980s. To compute 
the various capital ratios, we used information from the 
Consolidated Reports of Condition and Income (Call Reports) 
produced by the Federal Financial Institutions Examination 
Council. The Federal Reserve Board provides a formal 
algorithm for calculating risk-weighted ratios for 1991 and 
subsequent years. Risk-weighted capital ratios for 1988, 1989, 
and 1990 were estimated based on the Capital Adequacy 
Guidelines published by the Board of Governors of the Federal 
Reserve System.
Table 1 presents summary statistics for the three different 
measures of capital adequacy for the period 1988-92. Looking 
at the top panel of the table, we observe that the mean and 
median leverage ratios for our sample of banks during this 
period are fairly stable at around 9 and 8 percent, respectively. 
Since these statistics are based on unweighted data, they are 
influenced heavily by the large number of small banks that tend 
to have higher capital ratios. The average capital ratios 
weighted by assets (not shown in table) are lower. The table 
also helps to highlight that the gross revenue measure (middle 
panel) varies more widely across years, reflecting its close 
relationship with economic conditions. Relatively high gross 
revenue ratios in 1991 and 1992 can be explained by reduced 
banking revenue caused by an economic downturn. Both the 
mean and the median of the risk-weighted capital ratio 
(bottom panel) were substantially higher than the required 
ratio (4 percent). The standard deviation, however, was large, 










1988 13,299 0.094 0.082 0.077 -0.512 0.998
1989 12,903 0.096 0.083 0.076 -0.440 0.995
1990 12,388 0.094 0.082 0.072 -0.549 0.998
1991 11,941 0.094 0.082 0.070 -0.438 0.998
1992 11,473 0.096 0.085 0.068 -1.663 0.997
Total 62,004 0.095 0.083 0.073 -1.663 0.998
Gross Revenue Ratio
1988 13,299 1.146 0.866 3.712 -4.938 300.110
1989 12,903 1.228 0.816 13.192 -4.228 1,345.000
1990 12,388 1.032 0.819 2.239 -4.124 135.240
1991 11,941 1.211 0.864 15.051 -1.088 1,601.330
1992 11,473 1.253 1.004 6.683 -0.729 679.500
Total 62,004 1.173 0.871 9.595 -4.938 1,601.330
Risk-Weighted Capital Ratio
1988 13,299 0.186 0.142 0.264 -0.607 12.383
1989 12,903 0.195 0.144 0.608 -0.739 52.089
1990 12,388 0.179 0.136 0.298 -0.524 9.534
1991 11,941 0.208 0.139 3.040 -0.439 330.902
1992 11,473 0.193 0.147 0.487 -1.584 34.249
Total 62,004 0.192 0.141 1.390 -1.584 330.902
Sources: Federal Financial Institutions Examination Council, 
Consolidated Reports of Condition and Income; authors’ calculations.38 Capital Ratios as Predictors of Bank Failure
In Table 2, we present measures of correlation for all three 
capital adequacy ratios. While the Pearson correlation 
coefficients (top panel) are statistically significant, one may 
surmise from their magnitude that these capital measures are 
not consistently correlated over time. However, looking at the 
bottom panel of the table, which shows large and significant 
rank correlation estimates, we conclude that most of the large 
fluctuations in the parametric measure of correlation are 
caused by the presence of outliers. Although the rank 
correlation is high, these capital ratios are far from perfectly 
correlated. Thus, each capital ratio may provide some 
independent information about capital adequacy.
Distribution of Bank Failure
A good measure of capital adequacy should be related very 
closely to bank failure. The first phase of our analysis 
investigates this issue by looking at the distribution of bank 
failures with respect to the alternative capital ratios. Table 3 
presents one-year bank failure rates for various levels of the 
leverage ratio at the end of the preceding year. The table covers 
all failed and surviving banks during the period 1989-93. We 
excluded from the analysis all banks that were acquired during 
the period because many of these mergers involved problem 
target banks. In its final form, the data set is an unbalanced 
panel of banks, in which a bank is observed until the time of 
failure or until the end of 1993. To be specific, a bank that 
survived between 1989 and 1993 is counted five times as a 
nonfailure, and a bank that failed in 1991 is counted twice as a 
nonfailure (1989 and 1990) and once as a failure (1991). In the 
next subsection, we will also present a parametric model of 
survival that gives a more precise account of the conditional 
distribution of failure.
In the top panel of Table 3, we use an absolute scale to tally 
failures (observations of banks that failed within a year of the 
reported capital ratio) and nonfailures (observations of banks 
that did not fail within a year) for individual capital ratio ranges 
and cumulatively up to a given cutoff point. For noncumulative 
data, each range is bounded above by the cutoff point of the 
row and bounded below by the cutoff point of the previous 
row. The bottom panel of Table 3 uses a relative scale for the 
leverage ratio by classifying banks according to percentiles. The 
absolute scale is helpful for examining the failure experience at 
specific ranges of the ratio. In contrast, by dividing the data set 
into percentile classes of equal size, ranked by the ratio, the 
relative scale facilitates a uniform comparison of the different 
capital ratios.
As the column headed “Failure Rate for Row” indicates, the 
proportion of failed observations (number of failures divided 
by the total number of banks in the leverage ratio class) on an 
absolute scale (top panel) was more than 80 percent for 
institutions with negative leverage ratios. The proportion of 
failing bank observations decreases monotonically and rapidly 
with the leverage ratio; the relative frequency drops below 
10 percent in the leverage ratio range of 4 to 5 percent and 
below 1 percent in the 6 to 7 percent range. The proportion is 
quite small (0.1 percent or lower) for bank observations with 
leverage ratios higher than 7 percent. In relative terms, the 
bottom panel of Table 3 shows that the proportion of failures 
is very high (74.7 percent) for banks in the lowest 1 percentile 
leverage ratio range but quickly drops below 10 percent in the 
3 to 4 percentile class. The sharp drop-off in the proportion of 
failures is indicative of a successful measure.
A good measure of capital adequacy should 
be related very closely to bank failure. . . . 
Our analysis investigates this issue by 
looking at the distribution of bank failures 















1988 0.410 0.749 0.284
1989 0.216 0.442 0.179
1990 0.496 0.740 0.344
1991 0.151 0.179 0.020
1992 0.221 0.537 0.567
Total 0.194 0.210 0.069
Spearman’s Rank Correlation
1988 0.930 0.825 0.840
1989 0.932 0.849 0.865
1990 0.921 0.849 0.859
1991 0.911 0.824 0.833
1992 0.874 0.783 0.788
Total 0.917 0.830 0.841
Sources: Federal Financial Institutions Examination Council, 
Consolidated Reports of Condition and Income; authors’ calculations.FRBNY Economic Policy Review / July 2000 39
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(Type I Error) 
(Percent)
Absolute Scale
— 0 231 51 81.9 0.1 63.2
— 1.0 100 62 61.7 0.3 47.3
— 2.0 90 95 48.6 0.5 33.0
— 3.0 76 194 28.1 0.9 20.9
— 4.0 45 367 10.9 1.8 13.7
— 5.0 31 628 4.7 3.2 8.8
— 6.0 25 1,799 1.4 7.3 4.8
— 7.0 17 5,136 0.3 19.1 2.1
— 8.0 8 8,175 0.1 37.8 0.8
— 9.0 0 7,767 0.0 55.6 0.8
— 10.0 3 5,858 0.1 69.0 0.3
— 11.0 0 3,940 0.0 78.1 0.3
— 12.0 0 2,702 0.0 84.3 0.3
— Infinity 2 6,869 0.0 100.0 0.0
Relative Scale
1 0.97 330 112 74.7 0.3 47.5
2 2.95 166 277 37.5 0.9 21.0
3 4.03 46 397 10.4 1.8 13.7
4 4.78 22 420 5.0 2.8 10.2
5 5.20 13 430 2.9 3.7 8.1
6 5.51 7 436 1.6 4.7 7.0
7 5.75 8 435 1.8 5.7 5.7
8 5.92 3 439 0.7 6.8 5.3
9 6.06 3 440 0.7 7.8 4.8
10 6.18 2 441 0.5 8.8 4.5
25 7.22 18 6,180 0.3 22.9 1.6
50 8.55 5 11,063 0.0 48.3 0.8
75 10.46 3 11,065 0.0 73.6 0.3
100 Infinity 2 11,508 0.0 100.0 0.0
Sources: Federal Financial Institutions Examination Council, Consolidated Reports of Condition and Income; Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve 
System, National Information Center database; authors’ calculations.
Notes: Noncumulative data are for the range defined by cutoffs in the current and the previous row. Cumulative data are aggregated up to the cutoff point.40 Capital Ratios as Predictors of Bank Failure
In addition to reporting the frequency of failure for 
specific ranges, Table 3 presents cumulative frequencies. The 
cumulative proportion of nonfailures represents the number of 
surviving observations up to that leverage ratio cutoff point, 
divided by the aggregate number of nonfailing observations. In 
contrast, the cumulative proportion of failures represents the 
total number of failures for bank observations having a 
leverage ratio greater than or equal to the leverage ratio cutoff 
value, divided by the total number of failures.2 Looking at the 
cumulative proportion of nonfailures, we find that only 
0.5 percent of nonfailures would be classified under prompt 
corrective action as critically undercapitalized (that is, showing 
a leverage ratio of less than 2 percent).3 In comparison, 
33 percent of the failures did not fall in the critically 
undercapitalized region (67 percent did).
We may interpret these cumulative proportions using 
simple statistical hypothesis-testing terminology. In this 
context, the null or testable hypothesis is that the bank will 
fail within one year; the alternative hypothesis is that the bank 
will not fail over the same period. Acceptance of the null 
hypothesis, in turn, would be associated with some appropriate 
action on the part of the supervisory authority—for instance, 
closure of the bank. Accepting the null hypothesis when it is 
actually false (known as Type II error) is equivalent to closing a 
bank that would have survived beyond one year, which in 
Table 3 corresponds to the proportion of nonfailed bank 
observations. Similarly, the cumulative proportion of failures is 
analogous to the so-called Type I error, that is, the decision not 
to close an institution that failed within one year. Consider, 
for example, the 2 percent closure rule for critically 
undercapitalized banks, using the figures reported in the 
previous paragraph. The Type II error is only 0.5 percent 
(0.5 percent of nonfailures were statistically misclassified). In 
contrast, the Type I error for observations with a leverage ratio 
greater than 2 percent is 33 percent (that is, 33 percent of the 
failures were statistically misclassified). Note that there is a 
trade-off in general between the probabilities of Type I and 
Type II errors. It is impossible to reduce both simultaneously 
by shifting the cutoff ratio.
Although it would be difficult for bank supervisors to frame 
any practical regulatory goals based solely on these statistical 
errors, sound regulatory policies should help to promote some 
balance between these cumulative proportion errors of failure 
and nonfailure. As the lower panel of Table 3 suggests, the two 
cumulative ratios are approximately equal around the seventh 
percentile cutoff, which is equivalent to the 5.75 percent 
leverage ratio cutoff point.4 In addition, it is interesting to note 
that current FDICIA capital adequacy guidelines for well-
capitalized banks, which require a 5 percent leverage ratio, 
would have generated Type I and Type II errors of 3.2 percent 
and 8.8 percent, respectively.
Bank failures are correlated about as strongly with gross 
revenue ratios as with leverage ratios (Table 4). As in the case 
of leverage ratios, the proportion of failing observations 
declines quite rapidly with the gross revenue ratio, and failures 
are highly concentrated at low gross revenue ratios. The top 
panel may be somewhat difficult to interpret because the levels 
of the gross revenue ratio tend to be less familiar than the levels 
of standard capital ratios. Nonetheless, our results illustrate 
that the likelihood of failure is quite small for depository 
institutions that maintain a gross revenue ratio greater than 
60 percent. Interestingly, the bottom panel reveals that the 
cumulative proportion of failed banks (Type I error) is 
approximately equal to the cumulative proportion of 
nonfailures (Type II error) around the 60 percent gross 
revenue ratio threshold. Overall, a comparison of the bottom 
panels of Tables 3 and 4 suggests that the gross revenue ratio 
classifies failures and nonfailures about as accurately as the 
leverage ratio. The two panels show very similar failure rates, 
Type I errors, and Type II errors in each percentile class.
Finally, Table 5 shows the distribution of bank failures for 
the tier 1 risk-weighted capital ratio. In general, the 
distribution of failures against tier 1 risk-weighted capital 
ratios is comparable to that for the other capital ratios. 
However, the table also reveals a number of small 
differences between the tier 1 risk-based measure and the 
leverage ratio. Current FDICIA rules specify that a well-
capitalized bank must maintain, as minimum levels, a 
6 percent tier 1 risk-weighted capital ratio, a 10 percent total 
(tier 1 plus tier 2) risk-weighted capital ratio, and a 5 percent 
leverage capital ratio.5 Note that the failure rate at the 
6 to 7 percent tier 1 capital range is 5.2 percent. In 
comparison, the failure rate for well-capitalized banks with 
5 to 6 percent leverage ratios is only 1.4 percent (Table 3). 
This pair-wise comparison suggests that the 5 percent 
leverage ratio threshold is more binding than the 6 percent 
tier 1 risk-based requirement. Having said that, however, we 
should note that the stringency in the risk-weighted ratios is 
best captured by the total (tier 1 plus tier 2) ratio. Although 
the distribution table for the total risk-weighted measure is 
not included in this article, we find that the failure rate at the 
10 to 11 percent range is only 0.4 percent, suggesting that 
The gross revenue ratio classifies failures 
and nonfailures about as accurately 
as the leverage ratio.FRBNY Economic Policy Review / July 2000 41
Table 4
















(Type I Error) 
(Percent)
Absolute Scale
— 0 231 51 81.9 0.1 63.2
— 10 102 76 57.3 0.3 47.0
— 20 93 160 36.8 0.7 32.2
— 30 75 299 20.1 1.3 20.2
— 40 42 488 7.9 2.5 13.5
— 50 36 772 4.5 4.2 7.8
— 60 13 1,755 0.7 8.3 5.7
— 70 14 3,634 0.4 16.6 3.5
— 80 13 5,431 0.2 29.0 1.4
— 90 5 5,945 0.1 42.6 0.6
— 100 1 5,431 0.0 55.1 0.5
— 110 2 4,526 0.0 65.5 0.2
— 120 0 3,499 0.0 73.5 0.2
— Infinity 1 11,576 0.0 100.0 0.0
Relative Scale
1 8.85 323 119 73.1 0.3 48.6
2 25.17 148 295 33.4 0.9 25.0
3 34.56 60 383 13.5 1.8 15.4
4 42.61 24 418 5.4 2.8 11.6
5 47.93 20 423 4.5 3.8 8.4
6 51.97 7 436 1.6 4.8 7.3
7 54.83 4 439 0.9 5.8 6.7
8 57.16 3 439 0.7 6.8 6.2
9 59.09 3 440 0.7 7.8 5.7
10 60.87 2 441 0.5 8.8 5.4
25 75.30 19 6,179 0.3 22.9 2.4
50 94.27 11 11,057 0.1 48.3 0.6
75 120.24 3 11,065 0.0 73.6 0.2
100 Infinity 1 11,509 0.0 100.0 0.0
Sources: Federal Financial Institutions Examination Council, Consolidated Reports of Condition and Income; Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve 
System, National Information Center database; authors’ calculations.
Notes: Noncumulative data are for the range defined by cutoffs in the current and the previous row. Cumulative data are aggregated up to the cutoff point.42 Capital Ratios as Predictors of Bank Failure
the total risk-based measure may be the most binding of all 
the FDICIA capital adequacy ratios.
As expected, the performance of capital ratios deteriorates 
somewhat when we move from a one-year to a two-year 
horizon, that is, when we focus on failures occurring between 
one and two years after the capital ratio is observed. Tables 6-8 
summarize the second-year failure rates and cumulative 
distribution of second-year failures and nonfailures for firms 
that survive the first year. The three capital ratios still provide a 
fairly clear signal, as evidenced by the sharp drop in the failure 
Table 5
















(Type I Error) 
(Percent)
Absolute Scale
— 0 231 52 81.6 0.1 63.2
— 1.0 69 39 63.9 0.2 52.2
— 2.0 59 46 56.2 0.3 42.8
— 3.0 60 73 45.1 0.5 33.3
— 4.0 55 140 28.2 0.8 24.5
— 5.0 35 203 14.7 1.3 18.9
— 6.0 33 261 11.2 1.9 13.7
— 7.0 25 454 5.2 2.9 9.7
— 8.0 17 775 2.1 4.7 7.0
— 9.0 7 1,251 0.6 7.5 5.9
— 10.0 10 2,217 0.4 12.6 4.3
— 11.0 5 3,061 0.2 19.6 3.5
— 12.0 8 3,492 0.2 27.6 2.2
— Infinity 14 31,579 0.0 100.0 0.0
Relative Scale
1 1.50 330 112 74.7 0.3 47.5
2 4.31 158 285 35.7 0.9 22.3
3 5.89 51 392 11.5 1.8 14.2
4 6.87 27 415 6.1 2.8 9.9
5 7.55 10 433 2.3 3.8 8.3
6 8.03 8 435 1.8 4.7 7.0
7 8.44 2 441 0.5 5.8 6.7
8 8.77 4 438 0.9 6.8 6.1
9 9.05 1 442 0.2 7.8 5.9
10 9.28 5 438 1.1 8.8 5.1
25 11.42 15 6,183 0.2 22.9 2.7
50 14.66 10 11,058 0.1 48.3 1.1
75 19.86 2 11,066 0.0 73.6 0.8
100 Infinity 5 11,505 0.0 100.0 0.0
Sources: Federal Financial Institutions Examination Council, Consolidated Reports of Condition and Income; Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve 
System, National Information Center database; authors’ calculations.
Notes: Noncumulative data are for the range defined by cutoffs in the current and the previous row. Cumulative data are aggregated up to the cutoff point.FRBNY Economic Policy Review / July 2000 43
Table 6
















(Type I Error) 
(Percent)
Absolute Scale
— 0 24 15 61.5 0.0 94.8
— 1.0 28 19 59.6 0.1 88.8
— 2.0 43 36 54.4 0.2 79.6
— 3.0 44 107 29.1 0.5 70.1
— 4.0 60 227 20.9 1.2 57.2
— 5.0 69 428 13.9 2.4 42.4
— 6.0 71 1,391 4.9 6.4 27.1
— 7.0 57 4,001 1.4 17.9 14.8
— 8.0 32 6,627 0.5 37.0 8.0
— 9.0 9 6,285 0.1 55.1 6.0
— 10.0 6 4,714 0.1 68.6 4.7
— 11.0 6 3,242 0.2 78.0 3.4
— 12.0 5 2,190 0.2 84.3 2.4
— Infinity 11 5,462 0.2 100.0 0.0
Relative Scale
1 3.11 154 198 43.8 0.6 66.9
2 4.22 63 289 17.9 1.4 53.3
3 4.93 44 308 12.5 2.3 43.9
4 5.31 25 327 7.1 3.2 38.5
5 5.59 23 329 6.5 4.2 33.5
6 5.80 14 338 4.0 5.1 30.5
7 5.97 13 339 3.7 6.1 27.7
8 6.10 10 342 2.8 7.1 25.6
9 6.22 10 342 2.8 8.1 23.4
10 6.33 8 344 2.3 9.1 21.7
25 7.29 39 4,891 0.8 23.2 13.3
50 8.60 31 8,771 0.4 48.4 6.7
75 10.49 12 8,791 0.1 73.7 4.1
100 Infinity 19 9,135 0.2 100.0 0.0
Sources: Federal Financial Institutions Examination Council, Consolidated Reports of Condition and Income; Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve 
System, National Information Center database; authors’ calculations.
Notes: Noncumulative data are for the range defined by cutoffs in the current and the previous row. Cumulative data are aggregated up to the cutoff point.44 Capital Ratios as Predictors of Bank Failure
Table 7















 of Failures 
(Type I Error) 
(Percent)
Absolute Scale
— 0 24 15 61.5 0.0 94.8
— 10 30 25 54.5 0.1 88.4
— 20 51 82 38.3 0.4 77.4
— 30 50 183 21.5 0.9 66.7
— 40 65 311 17.3 1.8 52.7
— 50 69 494 12.3 3.2 37.8
— 60 64 1,183 5.1 6.6 24.1
— 70 49 2,545 1.9 13.9 13.5
— 80 25 3,998 0.6 25.4 8.2
— 90 10 4,628 0.2 38.8 6.0
— 100 5 4,429 0.1 51.5 4.9
— 110 3 3,840 0.1 62.6 4.3
— 120 3 2,988 0.1 71.2 3.7
Infinity 17 10,023 0.2 100.0 0.0
Relative Scale
1 26.19 130 222 36.9 0.6 72.0
2 36.63 69 283 19.6 1.5 57.2
3 44.64 58 294 16.5 2.3 44.7
4 50.08 32 320 9.1 3.2 37.8
5 53.72 21 331 6.0 4.2 33.3
6 56.48 24 328 6.8 5.1 28.2
7 58.90 10 342 2.8 6.1 26.0
8 60.93 15 337 4.3 7.1 22.8
9 62.56 6 346 1.7 8.1 21.5
10 63.99 8 344 2.3 9.1 19.8
25 78.24 49 4,881 1.0 23.1 9.2
50 97.39 19 8,783 0.2 48.4 5.2
75 123.78 8 8,795 0.1 73.7 3.4
100 Infinity 16 9,138 0.2 100.0 0.0
Sources: Federal Financial Institutions Examination Council, Consolidated Reports of Condition and Income; Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve 
System, National Information Center database; authors’ calculations.
Notes: Noncumulative data are for the range defined by cutoffs in the current and the previous row. Cumulative data are aggregated up to the cutoff point.FRBNY Economic Policy Review / July 2000 45
Table 8
















(Type I Error) 
(Percent)
Absolute Scale
— 0 24 16 60.0 0.0 94.8
— 1.0 18 10 64.3 0.1 91.0
— 2.0 22 11 66.7 0.1 86.2
— 3.0 32 27 54.2 0.2 79.4
— 4.0 39 68 36.4 0.4 71.0
— 5.0 34 125 21.4 0.7 63.7
— 6.0 49 156 23.9 1.2 53.1
— 7.0 46 306 13.1 2.1 43.2
— 8.0 58 546 9.6 3.6 30.8
— 9.0 38 974 3.8 6.4 22.6
— 10.0 37 1,784 2.0 11.6 14.6
— 11.0 15 2,533 0.6 18.9 11.4
— 12.0 10 2,880 0.3 27.2 9.2
— Infinity 43 25,308 0.2 100.0 0.0
Relative Scale
1 4.62 150 202 42.6 0.6 67.7
2 6.30 80 272 22.7 1.4 50.5
3 7.15 41 311 11.6 2.3 41.7
4 7.73 34 318 9.7 3.2 34.4
5 8.22 25 327 7.1 4.1 29.0
6 8.58 14 338 4.0 5.1 26.0
7 8.88 14 338 4.0 6.1 23.0
8 9.15 10 342 2.8 7.0 20.9
9 9.35 10 342 2.8 8.0 18.7
10 9.55 7 345 2.0 9.0 17.2
25 11.52 32 4,898 0.6 23.1 10.3
50 14.66 28 8,774 0.3 48.4 4.3
75 19.73 12 8,791 0.1 73.7 1.7
100 Infinity 8 9,146 0.1 100.0 0.0
Sources: Federal Financial Institutions Examination Council, Consolidated Reports of Condition and Income; Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve 
System, National Information Center database; authors’ calculations.
Notes: Noncumulative data are for the range defined by cutoffs in the current and the previous row. Cumulative data are aggregated up to the cutoff point.46 Capital Ratios as Predictors of Bank Failure
rates for individual ranges as the ratio increases. However, the 
failure rates for adequately capitalized bank observations are 
now considerably greater. In particular, the failure rate for 
observations in the 4 to 5 percent leverage ratio class is 
13.9 percent, as compared with the 4.7 percent one-year rate. 
Similarly, the failure rate is now 21.4 percent for observations in 
the 4 to 5 percent risk-weighted ratio range, as compared with a 
one-year rate of 14.7 percent. Overall, in the metric of a second-
year horizon, the three capital ratios perform quite similarly, 
although the likelihood of failure is somewhat harder to 
estimate than in the case of a one-year horizon.6
Qualitative Forecasts and the Probability 
of Failure
Our simple frequency distribution analysis shows that the three 
alternative measures of capital adequacy perform equally well 
in identifying failure. In this section, we employ parametric 
models of bank failure to examine more formally the 
conditional relationship between the likelihood of failure and 
the capital ratios. The simplest way to analyze bank failure is to 
use a qualitative response model. In this model, the dependent 
variable takes discrete outcomes (in our case, failure or 
nonfailure). We first estimate the likelihood of failure using a 
discrete logit model. Estimating the model over the entire panel 
may lead to biased estimates because the typical logit 
specification assumes that the event of failure is independent 
over time. To avoid the apparent time-dependency in the 
observations, we have estimated the logit model cross-
sectionally for each year from 1989 to 1993. In addition to these 
cross-sectional regressions, we analyze our sample of banks 
using a proportional hazard model. This model of survival 
will enable us to better estimate the conditional likelihood of 
failure over time.
The primary objective of the cross-sectional qualitative 
choice model is to evaluate how consistently these alternative 
capital ratios predict failure over time. In this framework, the 
dependent variable is the probability of failure in a given year, 
and the explanatory variables are the leverage ratio, the gross 
revenue ratio, and the risk-weighted ratio. Although many 
other balance-sheet and income-statement explanatory 
variables are relevant in predicting bank failure, we focus on 
the three capital ratios because our main purpose is not to build 
a failure-prediction model but instead to compare the 
effectiveness of various capital ratios.7
Table 9 reports the results of cross-sectional logit 
regressions for each year between 1989 and 1993. Overall, the 
logit analysis shows that all three alternative capital ratios 
predict fairly accurately failures occurring within one year. 
When each capital ratio is entered separately in the regression 
(models 1-3), the model coefficients are, without exception, 
statistically significant at the 1 percent level. Looking at the 
concordance ratios, we observe that the logit models based 
solely on capital ratios can accurately predict failures.8 The 
predictive performance of these capital measures is fairly 
robust over time. Among the three capital ratios, the leverage 
ratio generally achieves the highest pseudo-R2 and concor-
dance ratio.9 The difference in these forecasting efficiency 
measures among the alternative capital ratios, however, is very 
small. When all three capital ratios are included together in the 
logit regression (model 4), the gross revenue ratio appears to 
have the highest significance overall. Not surprisingly, the sign 
and magnitude of the regression coefficients in model 4 are less 
stable across the different years of estimation because of the 
high degree of collinearity between the three capital measures. 
Consequently, the interpretation of the logit coefficients is 
quite difficult in this joint model. As Table 2 shows, however, 
one advantage of the gross revenue ratio is that it is relatively 
less correlated with the other two competing capital ratios, 
meaning that it has the potential to add, on average, more 
information in the joint regression.
The relative performance of the risk-weighted ratio 
improves when the time horizon is extended to between one 
and two years (Table 10). The risk-weighted ratio outperforms 
the leverage ratio by small margins in terms of both the 
pseudo-R2 and the concordance ratio. On the other hand, the 
gross revenue ratio performs about as well as the risk-weighted 
ratio, especially when all three ratios are included.
Based on these regression results, simple capital ratios (the 
leverage ratio and the gross revenue ratio) appear to predict 
bank failure as well as the risk-weighted capital ratio, especially 
over short time horizons. A noteworthy finding is the strong 
performance of the gross revenue ratio in regressions that 
include all three variables. One explanation for the strong 
significance of the gross revenue measure may be that the ratio, 
in contrast to the others, draws independent information about 
financial flows from both balance sheets and income statements. 
Our simple frequency distribution analysis 
shows that the three alternative measures 
of capital adequacy perform equally well in 
identifying failure.FRBNY Economic Policy Review / July 2000 47
Table 9
Logit Regressions
Dependent Variable: Failure in Less Than One Year
1989
M o d e l  1M o d e l  2M o d e l  3M o d e l  4
Intercept -0.0878) -0.2646) -0.3497) -0.0901)
(0.5450) (0.0591) (0.0126) (0.5345)
Leverage ratio -77.8819) -74.4450)
(0.0001) (0.0001)
Gross revenue ratio -7.2188) 0.0093)
(0.0001) (0.9588)
Risk-weighted ratio, -46.5865) -2.0587)
   tier 1 (0.0001) (0.6595)
Pseudo-R2 0.1190) 0.1120) 0.1101)) 0.1191))
Concordant (percent) 98.0 97.7 97.0 98.1
Discordant (percent) 1.5 1.7 2.1 1.5




M o d e l  1M o d e l  2M o d e l  3M o d e l  4
Intercept 0.3984) 0.2650) 0.1679) 0.3967)
(0.0179) (0.1007) (0.2992) (0.0182)
Leverage ratio -96.0482) -49.5560)
(0.0001) (0.0194)
Gross revenue ratio -10.0654) -5.0353)
(0.0001) (0.0258)
Risk-weighted ratio, -58.8834) 0.7287)
   tier 1 (0.0001) (0.7317)
Pseudo-R2 0.1350) 0.1330) 0.1269) 0.1359)
Concordant (percent) 97.6 96.7 97.8 97.3
Discordant (percent) 1.1 1.2 1.1 1.1




M o d e l  1M o d e l  2M o d e l  3M o d e l  4
Intercept -0.3688) -0.2871) -0.4797) -0.2754)
(0.0260) (0.0781) (0.0034) (0.0939)
Leverage ratio -74.3724) -0.4529)
(0.0001) (0.9353)
Gross revenue ratio -8.2146) -8.0113)
(0.0001) (0.0001)
Risk-weighted ratio, -46.6516) -0.9220)
   tier 1 (0.0001) (0.7826)
Pseudo-R2 0.0790) 0.0756) 0.0648) 0.0757)
Concordant (percent) 97.5 97.5 97.4 97.5
Discordant (percent) 1.5 1.3 1.5 1.3




M o d e l  1M o d e l  2M o d e l  3M o d e l  4
Intercept 0.5121) 0.4550) 0.2586) 0.5875)
(0.0166) (0.0242) (0.2099) (0.0057)
Leverage ratio -87.2859) -7.2337)
(0.0001) (0.3267)
Gross revenue ratio -8.8321) -7.9533)
(0.0001) (0.0001)
Risk-weighted ratio, -52.4554) -1.8505)
   tier 1 (0.0001) (0.5221)
Pseudo-R2 0.0832) 0.0770) 0.0665) 0.0781)
Concordant (percent) 96.0 92.7 91.9 92.8
Discordant (percent) 2.4 3.2 4.0 3.1




M o d e l  1M o d e l  2M o d e l  3M o d e l  4
Intercept -2.4270) 0.0234) -2.3277) 0.0534)
(0.0001) (0.9416) (0.0001) (0.8761)
Leverage ratio -40.6257) 2.4996)
(0.0001) (0.3609)
Gross revenue ratio -7.9371) -7.8714)
(0.0001) (0.0001)
Risk-weighted ratio, -25.8946) -2.0740)
   tier 1 (0.0001) (0.2988)
Pseudo-R2 0.0192) 0.0290) 0.0157) 0.0293)
Concordant (percent) 91.4 92.9 93.8 92.9
Discordant (percent) 4.8 2.2 3.4 2.2
Tie (percent) 3.8 5.0 2.8 5.0
Failures 42
Nonfailures 11,431
Sources: Federal Financial Institutions Examination Council, Consolidated Reports of Condition and Income; Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve 
System, National Information Center database; authors’ calculations.
Notes: Numbers in parentheses are p-values. Pseudo-R2 is defined in endnote 9. See also Estrella (1998).48 Capital Ratios as Predictors of Bank Failure
This regression finding provides evidence that the gross 
revenue ratio can effectively supplement more complicated 
capital ratios.
Thus far, we have focused on the capacity of the capital 
measures to predict failure over shorter time horizons. One 
would expect that the efficacy of these regulatory capital ratios 
might deteriorate if we evaluate their forecasting ability beyond 
the one- or two-year horizon. Peek and Rosengren (1997) 
point out that most banks that failed during the New England 
banking crisis of 1989-93 were well capitalized two years before 
failure. Similarly, Jones and King (1995) argue that between 
1984 and 1989 most troubled banks would not have been 
classified as undercapitalized under the FDICIA rules. Those 
studies suggest that prompt corrective action rules mandated 
by FDICIA would have been ineffective in dealing with banking 
problems during those periods.
Table 10
Logit Regressions
Dependent Variable: Failure between One and Two Years
1990
M o d e l  1M o d e l  2M o d e l  3M o d e l  4
Intercept -0.1870) -0.4087) -0.5030) -0.2442)
(0.2954) (0.0177) (0.0034) (0.1774)
Leverage ratio -62.1593) -22.2474)
(0.0001) (0.0437)
Gross revenue ratio -5.7019) -0.6953)
(0.0001) (0.4567)
Risk-weighted ratio, -36.5074) -19.7745)
   tier 1 (0.0001) (0.0001)
Pseudo-R2 0.0437) 0.0425) 0.0449) 0.0466)
Concordant (percent) 86.7 87.1 88.8 88.8
Discordant (percent) 10.4 10.0 8.6 8.8




M o d e l  1M o d e l  2M o d e l  3M o d e l  4
Intercept -0.9504) -0.6484) -0.9654) -0.6917)
(0.0001) (0.0010) (0.0001) (0.0007)
Leverage ratio -50.6460) 18.8294)
(0.0001) (0.0001)
Gross revenue ratio -5.9608) -4.6201
-0.0001) (0.0001)
Risk-weighted ratio, -31.9536) -19.3007)
   tier 1 (0.0001) (0.0002)
Pseudo-R2 0.0191) 0.0278) 0.0252) 0.0299)
Concordant (percent) 86.1 87.2 89.7 88.4
Discordant (percent) 10.9 9.6 8.1 8.4




M o d e l  1M o d e l  2M o d e l  3M o d e l  4
Intercept -0.6818) -0.8511) -0.5561) -0.6623)
(0.0016) (0.0001) (0.0079) (0.0027)
Leverage ratio -56.1702) 19.9661)
(0.0001) (0.0805)
Gross revenue ratio -5.5291) -0.4750)
(0.0001) (0.5797)
Risk-weighted ratio, -37.8934) -47.2949)
   tier 1 (0.0001) (0.0001)
Pseudo-R2 0.0236) 0.0242) 0.0302) 0.0305)
Concordant (percent) 88.1 87.4 89.4 88.4
Discordant (percent) 9.3 9.7 8.2 8.5




M o d e l  1M o d e l  2M o d e l  3M o d e l  4
Intercept -2.4512) -1.7406) -2.1743) -1.6986)
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001)
Leverage ratio -41.4685) 13.1137)
(0.0001) (0.0419)
Gross revenue ratio -5.2671) -4.3610)
(0.0001) (0.0001)
Risk-weighted ratio, -28.6207) -14.0894)
   tier 1 (0.0001) (0.0741)
Pseudo-R2 0.0048) 0.0091) 0.0072) 0.0097)
Concordant (percent) 79.0 85.0 83.2 85.5
Discordant (percent) 11.6 8.1 9.4 7.8
Tie (percent) 9.4 6.9 7.4 6.7
Failures 43
Nonfailures 11,292
Sources: Federal Financial Institutions Examination Council, Consolidated Reports of Condition and Income; Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve 
System, National Information Center database; authors’ calculations.
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Despite the evidence that the performance of capital ratios 
is not very good at more distant horizons, our analysis suggests 
that these measures are actually able to disseminate useful 
signals long before the event of failure. For one, we find that 
failing banks begin to show signs of weakness (that is, become 
undercapitalized) two to three years before they are closed by 
supervisors. The chart presents the time-profile of the three 
capital ratios for failed banks, plotted according to the number 
of quarters before failure. The figure also includes analogous 
measures for a control sample of nonfailed banks. The control 
group consists of randomly chosen banks located in the same 
state and having an asset size similar to that of the banks in the 
failed group.
As the chart shows, the median capital ratios for the group 
of failed banks are consistently lower than the median ratios for 
the control sample of surviving banks. The shaded area in each 
panel of the figure represents the critical region for a one-sided 
test of equality. When the median capital ratio for the control 
group (dashed line) is in the shaded area, we cannot reject the 
hypothesis that the median capital ratios for the two groups are 
the same at the 1 percent level. For the most part, the median 
capital ratio for the control group of nonfailed banks is outside 
the shaded critical region, suggesting that all three capital ratios 
are fairly good predictors of failure even as far back as two to 
three years.
Another simple but interesting way to test the long-run 
effectiveness of the capital ratios in predicting failure is hazard 
analysis. Although the hazard specification is closely related to 
binary models such as logit or probit models, it offers a better 
way to analyze the apparent time-dependency in the 
conditional probability of failure. More specifically, the 
dependent variable in hazard analysis is the probability that an 
institution will fail given that it has not failed until that point of 
time.10 Thus, in contrast to the cross-sectional logit model that 
examines failure over shorter horizons, the proportional 
hazard specification analyzes the conditional likelihood farther 
into the future. To simplify our analysis, Table 11 examines two 
scenarios of survival. The top panel of the table evaluates the 
efficacy of capital ratios in forecasting the probability of failure 
from the first quarter of 1988. In this case, the implied 
dependent variable is the duration of time from the first 
quarter of 1988 until the bank fails or until the fourth quarter 
of 1993 for nonfailing banks (so-called censored observations). 
The explanatory variables in the hazard models (models 1-4) 
consist of the competing capital adequacy ratios as of the first 
quarter of 1988. Thus, in contrast to the yearly logit regression, 
which estimates the effectiveness of capital ratios in forecasting 
failure within one year or between one and two years, the 
hazard regressions evaluate the early warning capacity of the 
capital measures from the first quarter of 1988. To account for 
the economic downturn in 1990, the bottom panel of Table 11 
also estimates the probability of bank failure from the first 
quarter of 1990.50 Capital Ratios as Predictors of Bank Failure
It is clear from the estimated hazard that capital ratios 
continue to be fairly good predictors of failure even over longer 
time horizons. When each capital ratio is entered individually 
in the hazard regression (models 1-3), we find that all three 
capital ratios are again statistically significant at the 1 percent 
level. As the pseudo-R2 statistics indicate, the explanatory 
power of these capital measures is lower than that obtained 
with a one-year horizon (Table 9). This finding is not 
surprising, because the controls are now asked to forecast the 
likelihood of failure over a longer duration, sometimes as long 
as six years.
The risk-based measure shows a relatively high pseudo-R2 
in the hazard models separately estimating the effect of each 
capital ratio and also shows high statistical significance in the 
models including all three capital ratios. The good performance 
of the risk-based capital ratio is more pronounced in the 
analysis using a longer time horizon (top panel). The statistical 
significance of the gross revenue ratio is comparable to that of 
the risk-weighted ratio in model 4 of the bottom panel, using a 
shorter time horizon. This finding is consistent with the result 
of the logit analysis, which shows that the relative performance 
of the risk-weighted ratio improves over a longer time horizon.
The risk-weighted ratio takes into account the riskiness of 
assets, and the gross revenue ratio reflects the asset risk to the 
extent that riskier assets have higher expected returns. The 
results in a longer time horizon are more consistent with these 
expectations. Risk weighting is an attempt to reflect hetero-
geneous return variances across assets. In a short time horizon, 
however, differences in return variances across assets may not 
be significant. For example, the probability that default occurs 
within a month may be very low even for a risky loan that is 
highly likely to default within three years. Thus, a possible 
explanation for the improved performance of the risk-
weighted capital ratio over a longer time horizon is that the 
realization of differences in asset return variances takes time. 
This possibility also implies that in a short time horizon, risk 
weighting can overstate differences in asset return variances 
and hence reduce the accuracy of the risk-weighted ratio as a 
measure of capital adequacy.
Conclusion
This article compares the effectiveness of different types of 
capital ratios in predicting bank failure. An important result of 
our study is that simple ratios—specifically the leverage ratio 
and the ratio of capital to gross revenue—predict bank failure 
about as well as the more complex risk-weighted ratio over 
one- or two-year time horizons. This finding suggests that bank 
regulators may find a useful role for the simple ratios in the 
design of regulatory capital frameworks, particularly as 
indicators of the need for prompt supervisory action. Risk-
weighted ratios, in contrast, tend to perform better over longer 
horizons.
Our intention, however, is not to argue against the use of 
more sophisticated measures of capital adequacy in regulation. 
On the contrary, we suggest that simple capital ratios may not 
be well suited for the determination of optimum levels of bank 
capital. However, we show that simple capital ratios contain 
useful information and are virtually costless to compute. Thus, 
it may be possible to derive substantial benefits from the use of 
simple ratios—for instance, as supplementary or backstop 
requirements—even when more sophisticated measures are 
available for use in formulating the primary requirements.
Table 11
Cross-Sectional Proportional Hazard Analysis
Capital as of 1988:1
M o d e l  1M o d e l  2M o d e l  3M o d e l  4
Leverage ratio -22.7113) 7.3990)
(0.0001) (0.0207)
Gross revenue ratio -1.8274) 0.0263)
(0.0001) (0.7664)
Risk-weighted ratio, -13.3307) -18.5383)
   tier 1 (0.0001) (0.0001)
Pseudo-R2 0.0320) 0.0240) 0.0470) 0.0620)




Capital as of 1990:1
M o d e l  1M o d e l  2M o d e l  3M o d e l  4
Leverage ratio -10.3256) 21.5610)
(0.0001) (0.0001)
Gross revenue ratio -1.3772) -1.7109)
(0.0001) (0.0001)
Risk-weighted ratio, -10.4816) -17.7188)
   tier 1 (0.0001) (0.0001)
Pseudo-R2 0.0310) 0.0430) 0.0550) 0.0740)




Sources: Federal Financial Institutions Examination Council, 
Consolidated Reports of Condition and Income; Board of Governors of 
the Federal Reserve System, National Information Center database; 
authors’ calculations.
Notes: Numbers in parentheses are p-values. Pseudo-R2 is defined in 
endnote 9. See also Estrella (1998).
c
cEndnotes
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1. If banks prefer riskier assets (moral hazard), they might choose 
riskier borrowers within the highest risk-weight category. This effect, 
however, is unlikely to be large enough to offset the primary effect of 
reducing assets in the highest risk-weight category.
2. Note that the proportions of failures and nonfailures are cumulated 
in opposite orders. For instance, the cumulative proportion of 
nonfailures for the leverage ratio class of 2 percent is 0.5 percent. This 
proportion is the total number of surviving banks up to and including 
that class (51+62+95=208), divided by the aggregate number of 
surviving banks (43,643). In contrast, the cumulative proportion of 
failures for this same leverage ratio class is 33.0 percent. This value is 
equal to the cumulative number of bank failures for all banks with a 
leverage ratio greater than 2 percent (76+45+31+25+17+8+3+2=131), 
divided by 628, the total number of failures.
3. Technically, the criterion for critically undercapitalized banks uses 
tangible equity as a measure of capital, instead of tier 1, as in the 
leverage ratio. To economize on data reporting and to make results 
more comparable within the article, we base our illustrations on 
Table 3, which is based on the leverage ratio. Tangible equity ratios 
produce similar results.
4. Equality of Type I and Type II errors is an interesting illustrative 
benchmark, but regulators can clearly choose different levels of this 
trade-off to suit their goals and preferences.
5. Tier 2 includes loan-loss reserves and a number of convertible and 
subordinated debt instruments. Banks are allowed to use loan-loss 
reserves up to a maximum of 1.25 percent of risk-weighted assets.
6. If   is the estimated proportion (failure rate), a measure of the 
variance of the estimate is given by  , where   is the 
p
p 1 p – () n ¤ n
number of observations. This variance is larger when   is closer to ½ 
and   is smaller, both of which apply in the case of second-year rates 
as compared with one-year rates.
7. Early warning models use various balance-sheet and income-
statement variables to predict bank failure (see, for example, Cole, 
Cornyn, and Gunther [1995], Cole and Gunther [1995], and 
Thompson [1991]). Capital adequacy is highly significant in those 
models. Nevertheless, high correlation among variables reflecting 
financial strength makes it difficult to infer the significance of 
individual variables.
8. The concordance ratio is calculated based on the pair-wise 
comparison of failure probabilities estimated by a logit model. The 
estimated probability for each failure is compared with those for 
nonfailure (  pairs when there are   failures out of    
observations). A pair is counted as concordant if the estimated 
probability is higher for the failed one and discordant in the opposite 
case. Thus, a high concordance ratio indicates that the logit model 
accurately classifies failure and nonfailure.
9. The pseudo-R2 is defined as in Estrella (1998) by 
, where   is the value of the uncon-
strained likelihood,   is the value of the likelihood with only a 
constant term in the model, and   is the number of observations.
10. Because bank failure is a terminal event, the probability of bank 
failure at time   given that it has not failed until that point in time or 
hazard rate is   , where   is the 
cumulative probability of failure up to time  . The proportional 
hazard specification assumes that the hazard function is separable, 
that is,  , where   is a vector of explanatory 
variables and   is the baseline hazard function.
p
n
mn m – [] ´ mn
1 Lu log Lc log ¤ ()
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